Canada-China trade impacted by restrictions
Trudeau's Oil Tanker Moratorium landlocks expansion
In the 2006–2015 Harper era, expanding trade with China was seen as critical to Canada’s economic survival post-2008 financial crisis. China, with 17% of global GDP and voracious demand for oil and minerals, offered a lifeline for Canada’s resource-heavy economy (15% of GDP from energy). Harper aimed to diversify exports beyond the U.S. (80% of Canada’s trade) to tap Asia’s markets, especially China’s $85B trade relationship by 2015.
Key moves included approving Chinese SOE investments (e.g., CNOOC’s $15.1B Nexen takeover in 2012) and signing the Canada-China FIPA (2014) to protect investors and boost FDI, which hit $40B by 2015.
These were pitched as job creators and GDP boosters, leveraging China’s capital to fund Alberta’s oil sands without taxpayer dollars.
The Oil Tanker Moratorium Act (Bill C-48, enacted 2019) was *not* Harper’s policy but introduced by Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government, with Mark Carney’s influence as an economic and climate advisor shaping its environmental focus.
The ban blocks large oil tankers (>12,500 MT) from B.C.’s northern coast, scuttling export routes like Northern Gateway (approved under Harper).
It locks Chinese-held oil sands assets (e.g., CNOOC’s 10% stake) into continental markets, forcing discounted sales to the U.S. This reversed Harper’s vision of Pacific exports, prioritizing coastal ecosystems and Indigenous rights over trade expansion.
Summary
Harper’s trade push with China was a pragmatic bet on economic growth, but the tanker ban (a post-Harper pivot) undercuts it by trapping oil on the continent.
This clash—free trade rhetoric vs. restrictive policy—shows nations balancing global markets with domestic priorities.
Harper’s legacy is a mixed bag: he opened doors to Chinese capital but left Canada vulnerable to legal and economic constraints, now exacerbated by the ban’s limits on energy export aspirations.
Co-authored with insights from Grok (xAI)